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This is my response to Professor Kišiček’s commentary: 
First of all, I would like to thank Professor Kišiček for her comments and good feedback, 
especially for thinking on ways to extend my reflections to places I had not considered. Now, I 
am going to reply on three issues that I found interesting in Professor Kišiček's commentary.  
First, she states that the dialogue I present could be understood as an argument from 
authority. This kind of argument can be fallacious in the case where the acceptability of a point 
of view depends only on someone's authority. In the case I present, the sommelier is clearly an 
authority, and this is why the guest approaches him. However, the recommendation is not an 
argument from authority precisely because the guest has tasted the wine. Taste is evidence 
enough to accept the recommendation and order the wine. So, without the experience of taste, 
accepting the recommendation would have been a fallacious use of the argument from authority. 
Second, Professor Kišiček argues that we can consider taste in argument beyond the 
expression of a feeling. For example, she says, to analyze the arguments of culinary experts. 
Indeed, I agree that, for these experts, the feeling of taste is insufficient for their purposes. Even 
the experience of taste seems insufficient for these cases, since other types of elements (such as 
the qualifications of the wine shown by the professor) are needed to make a good argument. 
However, to focus the argumentative potential of taste on the judgment of taste was necessary to 
justify the main point of my paper, that is, that taste can be a borderline case of the technique of 
argumentative reconstruction. My analysis focuses on taste as a reason to make a decision 
precisely because the corresponding argument challenges the technique of reconstruction. On the 
contrary, an argument that appeals to someone else's taste, such as the culinary expert, can be 
more easily reconstructed. However, even in these cases of culinary experts, I think that a good 
sommelier would appeal to the feelings of his potential customers, which illustrates the 
importance of the expressive character (in terms of speech acts) of the judgment of taste.  
Finally, using Johnson & Blair's (1977) categories, Professor Kišiček argues that taste-
related arguments used by culinary experts can be acceptable, relevant, and sufficient. However, 
those categories involve the analysis of the relationship between premises and conclusion, which 
seems to be difficult to find in this type of argument. Should we adapt those categories? 
Professor Kišiček seems to suggest that to understand the sufficiency of a taste-related argument 
it is necessary to pay attention to the modes of the argument, or to other aspects of the object 
related to the argument, such as smell or image. This idea would be consistent with the one I 
develop in my paper because judgment of taste is understood as a reason that justifies a decision. 
Therefore, it is important to understand the role of these aspects in order to propose ways of 





Johnson, R.H., & Blair, J.A. (1977). Logical self-defense. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson. 
 
